Context Map¶
Keyspout's vocabulary is split by bounded context. Every term is defined in exactly one context file; the shared-types context owns the identifiers, encodings and domain strings that more than one subsystem must agree on byte for byte.
Contexts¶
- Shared Contract Types — identifiers, levels, signature domains and the canonical encoding that every subsystem shares.
- Record Cryptography and Version Integrity — sealing a secret into an immutable, bound record and committing its version.
- Identity, Sealed Delivery and Policy Verification — who is speaking, may they have this, and what is sealed to whom.
- Backend Admission and Durable Arming — what a store is configured to do, and whether the cleanup has proven that it runs.
- Deletion Evidence and Consume Outcome — what is actually known about a version, and who is responsible for it.
- Host Confinement and Key Material Posture — what the host can actually enforce, stated honestly before a run.
- Durable Key Lifecycle — owner-only key files, crash-safe replacement and verified identity reload across invocations.
- Keyspout Command-Line Interface — the foreground entry point, its exit codes, and the rules about what may be printed.
- Developer Test Environment — the Linux VM the gate needs, the guard that refuses to run its targets elsewhere, and what a status report may claim.
Inter-Context Relationships¶
- Shared Contract Types → Record Cryptography and Version Integrity: the record subsystem binds the shared bound metadata as associated data and writes the shared record path.
- Shared Contract Types → Identity, Sealed Delivery and Policy Verification: the delivery header and proof of possession are encoded with the shared canonical encoding and scoped by the shared signature domains.
- Shared Contract Types → Deletion Evidence and Consume Outcome: the deletion intent, report and observation are shared structures with shared signature domains and shared identifiers.
- Identity, Sealed Delivery and Policy Verification → Durable Key Lifecycle: S2 supplies and validates opaque typed agent/admin bundles; S6 persists and reloads them without exposing private halves to the CLI.
- Identity, Sealed Delivery and Policy Verification → the CLI and its consumers: S2 lends a private half to one closure (Scoped Key Use) so a delivery or record can be opened without key bytes ever reaching the caller.
- Durable Key Lifecycle → Identity, Sealed Delivery and Policy Verification: verified key reload restores the same pinned authority for a later invocation.
- Identity, Sealed Delivery and Policy Verification → Backend Admission and Durable Arming: verified identity, grant set, requested duration and the level pair are the input to an admission decision.
- Backend Admission and Durable Arming → Deletion Evidence and Consume Outcome: the armed intent, the exact version and the deadline are the input to the evidence subsystem.
- Backend Admission and Durable Arming → every principal: a sweep proof is signed by the arming admin and verified against pinned keys, so any principal can check the interval the store is admitted under without trusting the store.
- Record Cryptography and Version Integrity → Deletion Evidence and Consume Outcome: the record version identity is what a report and an observation must bind.
- Host Confinement and Key Material Posture → every other context: posture is reported through its own API and never through the backend capability channel.
- Deletion Evidence and Consume Outcome → Keyspout Command-Line Interface: the printable shape of a log record is decided once, in S2, so S3 can render a record it does not understand without inventing fields.
- All contexts → Keyspout Command-Line Interface: the CLI is the only place where these subsystems are wired together, and it owns the exit-code vocabulary and the redaction rule.